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AN OUTLOOK FOR THE NON-COMPLIANCE MECHANISM 
OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Sandrine Maljean-Dubois* 
 
Ranking among the basic challenges for the implementation of international 
environmental law in general and the Kyoto Protocol in particular are the 
monitoring of compliance by signatory parties and sanctions in case of non-
compliance. Contrary to other international environmental protection 
conventions, the Kyoto Protocol is based on economic tools governed by 
the “invisible hand” of the market rather than by any official regulator. 
Nevertheless, the efficient monitoring and sanctioning of breaches are vital 
conditions for the smooth running of the system and are justified by their 
ability to support economic competition. 
 
The Protocol’s negotiators had this in mind from the outset. However, 
during the Kyoto conference in 1997, no agreement was reached as to the 
actual content of a non-compliance procedure. This thorny issue was 
postponed until the first Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP). In 1998 a 
working group was set up and, after several meetings, it succeeded in drawing 
up a non-compliance procedure. Particularly controversial, this procedure 
was part of a package deal represented by the Bonn-Marrakech agreements, 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (COP) in 2001. In December 2005 in Montreal, the first 
COP/MOP did not reopen the discussion on its content and adopted 
mutatis mutandis the text the COP1 had proposed. The Kyoto Protocol has 
thus given rise to a non-compliance procedure, which is among the most 
elaborate and innovative of its kind, while the Compliance Committee is the 
most powerful and independent of all committees of its kind. The 
application of this system was then eagerly awaited. 
 
I. The Outline of the Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
This Compliance Committee operates within the framework of a plenary, a 
bureau and two branches, the “facilitative branch” and the “enforcement 
branch”. The Committee is one of the most powerful and independent 
committees of its kind established by an environmental convention.2 Made 
up of 20 members elected during the COP/MOP in Montreal, it has been 
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2 J. Voïnov Kohler, Le mécanisme de contrôle du respect du Protocole de Kyoto sur les 
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operational since March 2006. The members, who are elected for four years, 
sit “in their personal capacity”. They are of recognized competence in the 
field of climate change and in “relevant fields, such as the scientific, 
technical, socio-economic and legal fields”. Furthermore, members of the 
enforcement branch must have experience in the legal field. 
 
The functions of the plenary are mostly administrative and budgetary. It is 
the branches that deal with cases of non-compliance, and the bureau that 
submits implementation issues to the competent branch.  
 
The procedure can be triggered by the secretariat on the basis of non-
compliance reports provided by teams of experts, by “any party with respect 
to itself” or by “any Party with respect to another Party, supported by 
corroborating information”. The system is complex, heavy, extremely 
sophisticated and rather intrusive, both in the information gathering process 
(registry techniques, reporting system) and in terms of information 
processing (checks, compilation, communication). The procedure followed, 
at least before the enforcement branch, is undeniably hybrid. It goes beyond 
a classic diplomatic procedure of conciliation or even mediation and presents 
some jurisdictional traits.3 Indeed, because they are so sophisticated, the 
control techniques represent an important qualitative leap with regards to the 
well-tried procedures habitually used until a certain time in international 
environmental law. Even if numerous weaknesses and flaws remain, the 
Kyoto non-compliance system still presents in certain respects the picture of 
a giant with clay feet. 
 
The role of the multidisciplinary facilitative branch is to provide technical 
and financial advice and assistance to States experiencing difficulty in 
meeting their commitments. In order to do so, it must consider the 
“principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities” of States. This approach is above all educational. The branch 
can facilitate the provision of assistance outside the conventional sphere; it 
can also turn to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the different 
conventional funds.  
 
The enforcement branch has a different purpose. Its approach is more 
intrusive. The enforcement branch is in fact responsible for establishing 
whether or not the parties comply with their assigned commitments to limit 
and reduce emissions, with provisions concerning methodology and the 
communication of information (inventories, reports), and also eligibility 
criteria for flexibility mechanisms. In the case of a disagreement between a 
party and an expert review team under article 8, the Branch can also “apply 
adjustments to inventories” (art. 5§2) or “a correction to the compilation and 
accounting database for the accounting of assigned amounts” (art. 7§4). 
                                               
3 L. Boisson de Chazournes & M. Mbengue, “À propos du caractère juridictionnel de la 
Procédure de non-respect du Protocole de Kyoto”, in Changements climatiques. Les 
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Among the “consequences” when non-compliance is established, the 
enforcement branch can make a declaration of non-compliance, which 
constitutes an initial sanction that works through the reputation effect (name 
and shame). It can also ask the party concerned to present a plan analyzing 
the causes of non-compliance and indicating the measures and agenda for 
correcting this situation. The branch can also suspend eligibility for flexibility 
mechanisms if a party does not meet the criteria set or if its emissions exceed 
the amounts it has committed to. In this case, the amounts assigned for the 
following period will be reduced by 1.3 times the excess amount. The 
sanctions can therefore be considerable. Few international conventions have 
gone this far in terms of the establishment of a binding regime to react to 
breaches. Such measures are possible because the Protocol uses economic 
tools. However, though very elaborate, the system is not totally fail-safe. A 
State experiencing great difficulty could choose to override it. Of course, it 
would be excluded from market mechanisms and be “banished” from the 
community of parties, but it could on the other hand accumulate 
environmental debts until they became irrecoverable. Everything will depend 
in the end on the attractiveness of market mechanisms. If they more 
attractive, more States will fear exclusion and become more likely to accept 
greater pressure from the private sector to avoid or reduce the duration of 
such exclusion. Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the second 
commitment period (post-2012) is somewhat undermining motivation. 
Finally, as national objectives are negotiated by States, a party could always 
renegotiate its reduction objectives for the second period, integrating the 
weight of potential penalties. 
 
II. The Committee’s Practical Impact 
 
Set up in March 2006, the Committee has experienced a steady increase in its 
power. The main part of its function is indeed the verification of compliance 
with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Yet this substantial 
evaluation will not be examined before the end of the first period of 
commitment, in 2012. In the meantime, the Committee is in charge of 
verifying that the numerous procedural or administrative obligations imposed 
on the member states by the Protocol itself have been implemented, and that 
several important decisions from the Meeting of Parties have been added. 
Though procedural, these obligations are no less essential. They allow for the 
assessment of the quality and reliability of national inventories on emissions 
and of how comparable they are. They are thus necessary to evaluate at a 
later stage the reductions implemented. The verification must also allow the 
assessment of policies and measures set up to fight climate change and 
establish that the Party has set up a system, particularly a national register, 
allowing it to take part in the exchange mechanisms. The obligations are 
verified by expert review teams that are coordinated by the secretariat and act 
according to guidelines provided by the Meeting of the Parties. The 
Committee has already had to deal with five cases: one in the facilitative 
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branch, and the four others in the enforcement branch. In the case involving 
Greece, the enforcement branch considered that the Greek system for 
recording greenhouse gas emissions was defective and notably suspended 
Greece’s eligibility to take part in the flexibility mechanisms of the protocol 
for several months, thereby preventing its participation. 
 
Even if it is still too early to assess how well the compliance procedure 
works, its future is nonetheless under discussion in current negotiations on 
post 2012. All options remain open for the moment: will the verification 
procedure be kept or improved? Or will it be weakened, or cancelled in favor 
of a decentralized system of verification resting on the power of States alone?  
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